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Does liberalization of agricultural markets and  pattcrns of o  nership  anri f ontrol pose potential
an expanded role for the private sector result in a  political problems, as the sector is now the
competitive market structure in Africa? Jaffee  fastest-growing component of Kenyan agricul-
empirically investigates the organization and  ture and trade. Concems are growing about who
development of a dynamic African export-  is benefiting from this expanding trade.
oriented sector-  Kenya's horticultural exports
- in which the private sector has long had a  Mluch  of Kenya's horticultural trade is based
dominant role.  on contracted or vertically integrated supply
arrangements for raw materials, rather than open
Jaffee highlights the sector's impressive  market ties between producers and processors/
pattem of growth over the past two decades and  exporters.  Open market procurement of raw
examines the (ovwnership)  characteristics of  materials would prc  "ably entail high transaction
participating private firms, the competitive  costs and risk, but the importance of integrated,
pattem among those firms, and the institutional  contract-based links between producers and
means by which they procure raw materials for  marketers calls into question the often-expressed
processing and export.  assumption that liberalizing Africa's markets
will produce competitive, decentralized private
.- He finds that despite the Kenyan  market structures.
government's direct investments in processing
and trading activities and its application of  Various forms of centralized private control
regulations and targeted support measures to  may indeed be preferable to centralized public
strengthen the role of Kenyan Africans in the  control, but Kenya's experience with horticul-
horticultural trade, most of this trade remains  tural exports suggests that when an African
controlled by foreign-owned companies or  country such as Kenya privatizes agricultural
members of Kenya's small minority Asian and  processing and (export) marketing, the govern-
European communities.  ment must find a better way to monitor and
control dominant firms, to get companies to
Various foreign and local investments have  involve smallholder farmers in raw material
incorporated Kenyan Africans (as shareholders,  procurement operations, and to improve the
employees, or suppliers of raw materials), or  farmers' bargaining position with centralized
have stimulated the suppliers to invest in horti-  contracting firms.
cultural production or tradc - but the basic
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iI.  D4TRODUCTION
1.  Over the past two decades, many countries of SubSaharan Africa have experienced a
stagnation  or decline  in their traditional  agricultural  exports.  I Given that most African  countries
have remained  dependent  upon such agricultural  exports for the bulk of their foreign exchange
earnings, such poor  trade performance has been a  major component of  axid an important
contributing  factor to a wider  economic  crisis within the region. 2 This crisis has been evidenced
by low or negative rates of economic  growth, deepening  debt-service problems, deteriorating
physical infrastructure  and public services, reduced food security, and rising unemployment. 3
2.  The reduced  African  earnings  from agricultural  exports can be partly attributed tc adverse
trends in international prices for several of the region's most important export crops. For
example, over the 1978  to  1987 period, the avernge annual price changes for cotton, coffee,
tobacco and tea were all negative, ranging from -2.4% (for cotton) to -6.8% (for coffee). 4
However, unlike  many developing  countries of Asia and Latin America, most African countries
have not been able to  compensate for the declining world prices of  'traditional'  primary
commodities  by either increasing  export volumes  of (and market shares for) these commodities,
I  World Bank (1981,  Tables 7 and 14), (1989, Tables 12 a7td  15).
2  In 1985, eighteen countries of sub-Saharan  Africa relied upon food and agricultural  products  for 60% or
more of their merchandise  export earnings. For some countries,  this share exceeded  80  % (World Bank  (1987,  Table
11).
3  For discussions  of Africa's economic  crisis, see Lofchie (1986),  Ravenhill  (1986),  and the World Bank
(1989,1990).
4  World Bank (1990) Price Prospects  for Primary Commodities.  international  Trade Division. International
Economic  Department.  An analysis  by Macbean  and Nguyen  (1987) indicates  that the average annual price changes
for these commodities  as well as other major African agricultural  exports (eg. sisal, bananas, and sugar) were all
negative over the 1960  to 1981  periodincreasing tne value added content from these traditional commodities, or diversifying their
agro-industrial  export base. 5
3.  This absolute and relative decline of many African agricultural export sectors and the
limited degree of export diversification  in the region has led an increasing  number of analysts
tc conclude that the region's poor performance  has less to do with adverse international  market
conditions  than with internal institutional  failures. Specifically,  Africa's poor export and wider
agricultural performance has been attributed to various forms of government or bureaucratic
failure,  including  misguided macroeconomic and  price  policies,  excessive  government
interventions  in factor and commodity  markets, and mismanaged  and inefficient  state-owned  or
state-directed marketing organizations. 6 Much of  the  recent social science research and
literature on  sub-Saharan Africa has been oriented toward documenting these and  other
dimensions  of government  failure.'
4.  This  analysis  of  misguided government policies  and  inefficient and  inequitable
institutional  structures in African agriculture has led many researchers and donor agencies to
Over the 1966-80  period, the total  volume  of African  agricultural  exports declined  by 17  %, compared  with
a 23  % increase for all developing  countries. (Calculated  from FAO Trade Yearbooks)  Significant  export volume
reductions  occurred for Africa's three most important  export crops--coffee.  cocoa, and cotton. Over the 1970-85
period, SSA experienced a decline in its world market shares for nearly all of its most important export crops
(Svedberg  (1991, p.552). The region's exports of coffee, cocoa, cotton, tobacco, tea, and timber  products have a
far lower value added content than those for Latin America  and Asia (World Bank (1981,  Table 17).
6  This  conclusion  has been  reached by analysts  on different  points of the political  spectrum  and for different
ressons. Those sharing this conclusion  include: Ellis (1982),  Hart (1982),  Hyden (1983, 1990), and Williams  (1985)
from the left of the political spectrum and Bates (1981),  de Wilde (1984),  and Berg (1985)  from the right of the
political  spectrum.
7  Examples  include: Arhin, Hesp, and van der Laan (1985),  Cleaver  (1986),  Nellis (1986),  FAO (1986),  Ghai
and Smith (1987)  and World Bank (1981,  1989,  1990).
2recommend  policy 4djustments  as well as the restructuring  of agricultural marketing systems.
With regard to the latter, emphasis  has been placed on expanding the role of the private sector
in the supply  of inputs  and product marketing  services, liberalizing  commodity  and input  markets
to allow greater competition, and placing greater reliance upon market forces  rather than
administrative  or political devices to direct production and trade decisions.
5.  Beyond  such abstractions,  however, what are the actual forms that private enterprises are
likely  to take in the context of African  agro-industry  and agricultural  trade? What types of firms
will be able to take advantage of liberalized markets to compete against or replace parastatal
marketing boards? Will the liberalized markets actually be competitive  or will economies of
scale, operating risks,  rent-seeking activities and other  factors lead to  private monopolies
replacing  public monopolies?  Will private enterprises coordinate production and marketing by
relying upon open market purchases of crops or by involving themselves more closely in the
production  process? Despite  the widepread  advocacy  of liberalization  and privatization  in Africa,
empirical analysis of the organization  of actual private marketing  systems is lacking. 9
6.  This paper provides a preliminary  empirical  investigation  of these issues, drawing upon
evidence from  Kenya.  While  parasta.al  marketing boards  and  other  government crop
development  or marketing  agencies  have accounted  for the bulk of Kenya's agricultural exports
8  Most  discussion  and empirical  analysis  has focused  on macroecononic  and  pricing  issues. Over  the  past
five years.  however,  there  has  been  a growing  concensus  that  price  and  macroeconomic  policies  are less important
in influencing  agricultural  performance  than  previously  thought  and  that  the 'right'  policies  are unlikely  to have  the
desired  effects  unless  wider  techno-organizational  changes  occur  within  African  agriculture.  Compare,  for  example,
Vtorld  Bank  (1981)  with World  Bank  (1989)  and  (1990).
9  Lele (1988)  attributes  the abstract  nature  of the recommended  institutional  reforms  and the absence  of
comparative  performance  assessments  to the fact that little is known about private  or 'non-state'  marketing
institutions  in Africa. Several  recently  completed  studies  provide  an initial  empirical  basis for analyzing  issues
related  to the  private  sector  and  agricultural  processing  and  marketing  in Africa.  These  include:  Watts  et al. (1988),
Marsden  (1989), and  Jaffee  (1990).
3over the past half-century. private enterprises-- both locally- and foreign-owned, have played
important roles in certain sub-sectors.'" This study will focus on the organization of Kenya's
horticultural  export sub-sector  as this has been  dominated  by private enterprises since the 1930s
when horticultural products were first exported from Kenya on a regular basis. In contrast to
most other components  of Kenyan  agriculture, the horticultural sub-sector  (including  fresh and
processed fruit and vegetables  and cut flowers) has never featured  a parastatal marketing  board
with major trading or regulatory  functions. The sub-sector  is also one of the few components
of Kenyan agriculture in which the government  has allowed and even encouraged competition
between and among private, cooperative, and parastatal enterprises, both in the domestic and
export markets.
7.  The balance  of the paper comprises  five sections. Section 2 provides  a brief overview  of
the growth and development of Kenya's horticultural exports over the past quarter century.
Section 3 examines the ownership and other characteristics of the private sector in Kenya's
horticultural trade. Section 4 examines the extent and forms of competition  in this sub-sector.
Section 5 examines the wide range of institutional arrangements  adopted by private firms to
coordinate their own processing and marketing activities with the farm-level production of
horticultural  commodities  and raw materials. This section draws upon insights from transaction
cost economics  to develop and test a series of hypotheses  regarding crop producer - marketer
institutional  linkages for different crops. The final section draws conclusions  from the study.
8.  The data upon which the empirical  analysis  is based were obtained  from field interviews
with Kenyan producers, processors, and exporters in  1985 and 1986, from published and
'°  On the  history and significance  et marketing  boards in Kenya, see Heyer (1976) and Yoshida  (1984).
4unpublished  official government  statistics, and from the sales and crop procurement records of
private Kenyan  and foreign companies.:'
H.  DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF KENYAN HORTICULTURAL EXPORTS
9.  Throughout the period of colonial rule in Kenya (1895  -1963),  the production and trade
of  fresh  and  processed  fruit  and  vegetables  and  of  cut  flowers  remained  greatly
underdeveloped.' 2 Prior to World War II, this horticultural sub-sector was characterized by
an absence of modern marketing  facilities  and nation-wide  marketing  organizations,  an absence
of official  grades and standards  for fresh produce, and a virtual absence of research and advisory
services. While small export trades in potatoes and in passion fruit juice were developed by
private firms  during the inter-war  years, the bulk of fruit and vegetable  production  in Kenya  was
of  very low quality and Kenya remained a  net importer of  fresh and processed fruit and
vegetable products.
10.  In the period between  the war and Kenyan  independence,  the colony  did begin to develop
the scientific, infrastructural, and institutional  basis to pursue a larger and more diversified
horticultural export trade  and to  penetrate the expanding European market for fresh and
processed horticultural  products. Still, at independence  such trade only amounted to U.K. L 1.2
million,  or about 3 % of the country's total agricultural  exports. More than two-thirds  of Kenya's
"  Interviews were held with forty-four fruit and vegetable processors and fresh horticultural commodity
exporters which together accounted  for 97% of Kenya's horticultural  exports during the mid-1980's.  Information
was obtained on  the background, ownership, size,  and commodity mix of  the firms as well as their crop
procurement and export sales arrangements. Surveys were also conducted of small, medium, and large-scale
producers of major horticultural  crops.
12  The  historical development  of the Kenyan horticultural  export sub-sector is examined in detail  in Jaffee
(1990).
5horticultural exports  were  accounted for  by  a  single  product- canned  pineapple--whose
production in Kenya remaineet  unprofitable  for many years and for which Kenya's competitive
position in international markets was very weak. Kenya's continued exports of  this product
depended upon government subsidies  and protection for the participating  firms."  Small-scale
exports of other processed fruit and vegetable  products were also developed,  although  here again
the participating firms experienced continued raw material supply problems and  were not
competitive  due to high costs of intermediate  inputs.
11.  During this period, expatriate-owned  private and cooperative enterprises pioneered a
trade in high-quality,  air-freighted  fresh fruit, vegetables,  and cut flowers during the European
winter 'off-season'. However, this trade was constrained  by the limited availability  of air-cargo
facilities  out of Kenya and the limited  investments  in Kenya in irrigation  facilities  and marketing
infrastructure (eg. storage units, refrigerated trucks). While the colonial govemment invested
heavily  during this period in production  and processing  facilities for such export crops as coffee,
tea, and pyrethrum, public investments  in the horticultural sub-sector  were minimal.
12.  Through much of the 1960s, Kenya's horticultural exports grew very moderately as
processing  companies  continued to encounter  raw material  supply  problems  and as fresh produce
exporters faced continued international  transport bottlenecks.  By the early 1970s, however, the
sub-sector  appeared poised for a major expansion  as a result of several large-scale investments
in  production (eg.  irrigation) and processing infrastructure, favorable international market
conditions, and an expansion in the availability  of air-freight facilities. Several of the major
investments  in processing  facilities  and in crop development  entailed joint ventures between the
'3  See Swainson  (1980, p.157-59)  and the case study on the pineapple  canning  industry in Jaffee (1991).
6Kenyan  government and multinational  corporations. Govemmenit  participation  in such ventures
provided the foreign partners with low cost access to land, with preferential and subsidized
access to public services (eg. roads, rail cargo, electricity), and with reduced financial risks.
13.  Since  the early 1970s,  the horticultural  export sub-sector  has developed  into an important
component  of the Kenyan  economy, providing  a major and growing source of foreign  exchange
earnings as well as substantial  employment  and farm income opportunities. During a period in
which Kenya's exports of many of its traditional  commodities have stagnated or declined (eg.
sisal, pyrethrum, cotton, meat products), or fluctuated  considerably  from year to year (coffee,
maize), the aggregate  volume and value of horticultural  exports has increased substantially  and
virtually continuously." 4 As Table 1 and the Appendix 1 graph indicate, there has been
double-digit  growth on an annual basis in horticultural  exports since 1973.  By 1988,  horticultural
exports  were  valued at approximately  100 million Kenyan Pounds  (eg.  U  '.  $105  million),
representing 17% of  the  countrv's  total  agricultural exports.  If current  trends continue,
horticultural products may surpass both coffee and tea during the 1990 to become Kenya's
leading commodity  export sub-sector.
''  The development  of Kenya's traditional  and non-traditional  agricultural  export sub-sectors  is analyzed  in
Jaffee (1990).
7Table 1: The  Expansion of Kenya's Horicultural Exports, 1973-1988'
Years  Volume  Value
(O00  Tons)  (LK Million)
1973  27.4  3.6
1974  21.6  3.8
1975  34.4  8.4
1976  47.3  13.2
1977  67.8  18.8
1978  66.7  19.1
1Si79  66.3  21.2
1980  66.3  23.1
1981  69.6  27.2
1982  70.6  31.5
1983  83.0  43.3
1984  90.0  51.6
1985  87.1  57.3
1986  93.3  65.3
1987  93.4  81.9
1988  111.1  99.9
Average Annual
Change  1973-88  11.6  28.0
a.  Includes  Standard  intemational  Trade Classification  (SITC)  categories  051 (except  nuts). 053,054  ,except  cassava  and
dried leguminous  vegetables),  035, and 2927 (cut flowers). From 198-,.  categories  051 and 053 became  057 and 058.
Sources: Kenya  Annual Trade Retums; Data from the Horticultural  Crops Development  Authority  (HCDA))
14.  The expansion of Kenya's horticultural exports has been based upon a wide range of
individual commodities and  provides  the  only  significant  case  of  agricultural  export
diversification  in Kenya since World War II. In recent years, Kenya's horticultural trade has
consisted of  more  than  sevZr  .y-five different  commodities/products from  the  following
categories:
(i)  canned  fluit  and vegetables  (including  canned pineapple  and french beans),
(ii)  ftuit  and vegetable  juices (inclu -ng  pineapple, passion fruit, orange, and tomato
juices),
8(iii)  fresh tenm-erate,  sub-tropical,  and  tropicalfr",',s  and vegetables  (including  french
beans, cnillies, okra, mango, avocado, strawberry, pineapple, passion fruit, and
many others),
(iv)  cutflowers (including  carnations,  roses, alstroemeria,  chrysant'emums,  statise,
and others), and
(v)  vegetable  and  flower seeds  (both  hybrid  and generic).
15.  The  development  of Kenya's horticultural trade has not been even across commodities.
In the pineapple  canning and cut flower industries, trade has expanded  enormously, placing the
country  among  the five leading  - xporters  world-wide.  Significant  expansions  of trade and market
shares have also been achieved for several fresh fruit and vegetables, especially french beans,
strawberries, and a  wide range of so-called 'Asian'  vegetables (eg. chillies, okra,  karela).
However, for a range of other fresh and processed products, Kenya has either not maintained
former levels of trade or has achieved  only moderate  trade increases, despite a rapid expansion
in West European and Middle Eastem import demand.
16.  Although  growth has been uneven, the recent development  of the sub-sector has led to
a wider spread of the benefits from trade due to a considerable  broadening  of participation  in
production  and (some) marketing  activities. For much of the period through to the early 1970s,
export-oriented  production  was dominated  by medium-to-large-  scale  farmers  based in centralized
locations, although  a few individual  projects involving  government participation  did attempt to
organize raw material supplies from smallholder  farmers.' 5 However, with the diversification
of trade over the past decade and with increased competition  amongst exporters, large numbers
of  smallholders, some  located in  relatively remote and  undeveloped regions have been
is  See Jaffee (1991) for severi  cases in Kenyan agro-industry  where attempts were made to incorpoate
smallholder  outgrowers.
9encouraged  to produce for the export market. By the mid-1980s,  some 35,000 smallholders  were
producing specialty horticultural crops for processing  or for export in fresh form.
m.  THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR
17.  In  the period prior to  World War 11, much of  Africa':  external trade  in  primary
agricultural  commodi.ies  wa- handled  by European  trading companies  operating with the support
and  protection of  metropolitan and colonial governments.'6  In  some countries, a  foreign
business class (such as the Lebanese  in West Africa and Indians and Arabs in East Africa)  also
played an important role in  this trade and  in domestic agricultural marketing.  With the
development  of marketing  boards and other parastatal  organizations  during the war and post-war
years, the relative importance of such European and resident Asian/Arab trading companies
diminished  in many African countries.
18.  A major concern of many African  governments  up to the present is that the liberalization
of agricultural markets will result in the dominance of foreign companies or particular ethnic
groups in agricultural trade, which they perceive as economically  and politically undesirable."
In Kenya, this outlook has led to a policy of  'Kenyanization' (eg. Africanization)  of  many
sectors of the economy, including  elements  of the horticultural  export trade. This policy  has been
pursued  through  various means  including  restrictive  licensing  arrangements,  restricted  access and
Id  See Bauer (1954) and van der Laan (1987) for West Africa and Martin (1973) and Swainson  (1980) for
East Africa.
17  See Abbott  (1987); Berg (1987); and Schatz (1987).
10targeted programs for production and other credit, direct government investments, and laws
restricting the hiring of non-Kenyans. 8
19.  Despite direct govemment investments in certain production, processing, and trading
activities, and  the application of  regulations and positive support measures to increase the
'Kenyanization'  of  horticultural trade,  this  trade  has  remained  largely  controlled  by
foreign-owned companies or  members of  Kenya's  small  minority Asian and  European
communities.  This is clearly evident .rom Table 2 below which provides a breakdown  of the
trade shares for different types of firms.
Table 2:  Shares of Kenva  's Horticultural  Export Trade  bY Firm Ownership, 1985-86  (percentages)
Firm  Fresh Fruit  Cut  Processed Fruit
Ownership  +  Vegetables,  Flowersb  +  Vegetablesc  Combined'
Foreign-owned  (MNCs t 0  58  91  54
Private-Locally Owned  97  38  9  43
Of which:
Kenyan Asian  81  0  7  30
Kenyan European  9  35  2  10
Kenyan African  7  3  0  3
Local Cooperative  0  1  0  1
Kenyan Parastatal  3  3  0  2
Total  100  100  100  100
a.  Export Volumes  for 1985.
b.  Export Values  1985/86  season.
c.  Export Values for 1986.
d.  Estimated  for the export value for 1986.
e.  Includes  joint ventures with majority  foreign  ownership  and management  control.
Source: Author's Field Research
'I  See Swainson (1980) and Schluter (1984,
1120.  Until quite recently, the government  has restricted  the trade of fresh fruit and vegetables
only to companies having 50 or more local ownership." 9 Since the mid-1970s,  the govemment
has also tried several measures  to encourage  Kenyan  African participation  in this trade. These
have included: (1) pressures on Asian-owned  firms to take on African partners, (2) government
promotion of African-owned  exporters in overseas trade fairs, and  (3) preferential access for
African-owned  firms to the air-freight  facilities of Kenya Airways.
21.  While many Kenyan African-owned  firms have indeed entered this trade, the trade
remains dominated  by firms owned by Kenyan  Asians, with firms  owned or managed  by Kenyan
Africans accounting for only a 10 share. 20 Most of the leading Asian-owned  firms are family
companies or partnerships.  Each of these firms had considerable experience in  fruit and
vegetable  production  and/or trade in the domestic market before entering the export trade. Most
have their own wholesale and/or retail establishments  and their own farms; some also have
complementary interests in freight forwarding and transport. Some of the leading exporters
benefit from having relatives in Europe with whom they  conduct a significant proportion of
their trade. These operating features signficantly  reduce the risks and transaction costs which
such firms face in conducting  their horticultural marketing  activities.
22.  The higli failure rate for African-owned  exporters and the limited growth of active
African firms can be associated  with the following:
"9  In 1988, Del Monte-owned  Kenya Canners was issued  a license  to export fresh pineapples.  With Kenya
Canners diverting part of its estate production  to the fresh market rather than exclusively  to its factory, Kenya's
fresh pineapple  exports increased  from 925 tons to 16,745 tons between 1987  and 1988.
'  The Kenyan 'Asian' population  comprises a large  number  of individual  sub- communities  with differences
in religion, language,  and place of origin. Gujarati-speaking  Hindus from India  are the largest group but this group
is itself  divided  into several distinct  communities.  There  are also several  communities  of Gujarati-speaking  Moslems
and Punjabi-speaking  Moslems, Hindus, and Sikhs. Kenya's Arab commnunities  are also considered part of the
country's 'Asian' population.
12(i)  most of the African entrepreneurs  entering this  field had no prior experience in
horticultural  trade or in intl national marketing  per se. They have instead relied
upon  'learning  by  doing',  a  strategy  which  is  very  risky  in  the  field  of
horticultural  marketing where  information,  contacts,  and  trader  reputations  are
key components of competitive advantage and disadvantage 21,
(ii)  most such entrepreneurs  have maintained  diverse business or other professional
interests which have little or no relation to horticultural  marketing, yet which
have  tended  to  consume  most  of  their  attention  and  resources.  During  the
mid-1980s,  several  prominent  govemment  officials  owned  and  managed
horticultural export companies 22, and
(iii)  most of these African-owned firms have sought to operate only on a small-scale
or part-time basis, trading in a single or narrow range of commodities. Such
operational patterns have made these firms less attractive to overseas buyers,  to
air carriers  providing air-freight services,  and to medium-to-large-scale growers
looking for secure market outlets for their production.
23.  Through the mid-1980s, the bulk of Kenya's  cut flower exports  were accounted for by
foreign-owned companies or firms owned and managed by Europeans who have taken up Kenyan
citizenship. This is largely due to the lack of an official Kenyan system of floricultural research
and extension and a lack of local knowledge regarding  European floricultural  product demand
and marketing channels. Although several African-owned companies have developed successful
production  and  trading operations  for flowers,  these have mostly remained very  small  scale.
Kenyan government efforts to promote the Kenyanization of the industry have been more limited
in the case of cut flowers than that of the fresh produce trade. They have involved some direct
investments by the parastatal Agricultural Development Corporation in cut flower production and
21  This contmadicts  Marsden's (1990) contention  that 'modem African entrepreneurs  tend to set up business
in fields  with which they  are familiur,  either through family  upbringing  or work  experience. They  avoid great leaps
in the dark".  (p.  12)
22  Among those civil servants who owned or were partners in horticultural export companies  during the
mid-1980's  were the Minister  and Assistant  Minister  of Agriculture,  the Minister  of Lands and Settlement,  and the
Chairman  and General Manager of the Horticultural  Crops Development  Authority.
13pressures on foreign companies  to limit the size of their expatriate staff and to provide training
to Kenyans."
24.  In contrast with fresh produce, Kenyan  exports of processed fruit and vegetable products
have been dominated  by a limited number of majority foreign-owned  companies. Over the past
two decades, one firm, a subsidiary of Del Monte, has accounted for 80 or  more of  such
exports. The only other processing  firms which have been oriented  primarily to export markets
have also featured  the involvement  of a foreign company,  either in a joint venture with a Kenyan
parastatal  or private company  or within the framework  of a management  and marketing  contract
with a local firm. All such operations have been linked into the global  production and marketing
operations of major multinational  corporations. The Kenyan  government has sought to increase
'Kenyan control' in this industry  by entering  into joint ventures with foreign partners. However,
such local control has generally been illusionary as  the local partners have typically been
'sleeping partners' (eg. equity holders without influence), while most fundamental  production,
marketing, and financial decisions  have been made by the foreign partners and their overseas
parent companies. 24
25.  In contrast, the vast majority of locally-owned  fruit and vegetable  processing  companies
have focused  on serving the Kenyan  domestic market, a strategy made profitable  due to strong
tariff and non-tariff  barriers on imports  of competing  products into the country.  Such firms did
I'  The Agricultural  Development  Corporation  has had its core activities  in areas of 'strategic' importance  in
agriculture, such as seed production  and cattle breeding. The ADC was forced by the government  to purchase  an
existing  flower  farm, ostensibly  to encourage  increased  Kenyan  involvement  in the industry.  Another  relevant factor
may have been that the prominent government  officials who owned the farm were losing considerable  sums of
money.
2'  This pattern also exists in other industries  in Kenya.  See Langdon  (1981) and Gachuki (1982).
14service the neighboring markets of Tanzania and Uganda under the tariff umbrella of the East
African Community. However, with the disolution of the EAC in 1977 and the subsequent
political and/or  economic crises  in  these  neighboring countries,  such  exports  declined
substantially. Most such locally-owned  firms have not been cost or  quality competitive in
international  markets.
26.  Taking the three sub-sector  segments  together, we estimate that in 1986, foreign-owned
companies  accounted for more than one-half of the value of Kenya's horticultural trade while
firms owned by  Kenyan Asians and Europeans accounted for another 39. Firms owned by
Africans or having Africans in senior management  positions accounted for just 6 of trade.
27.  This pattern of development  has both positive  and negative  aspects. On the positive side,
without the technical skills and marketing expertise and links of foreign companies, Kenya's
horticultural  trade, especially  that for cut flowers  and processed fruit and vegetables, would  have
been considerably lower.  A  few  foreign investments have had  a  demonstration effect,
encouraging local entrepreneurs to  make similar investments in production and post-harvest
facilities. On the negative  side, such an ownership  pattern poses potential  political problems  as
this sector is now one of the fastest growing components  of the Kenyan  economy and concerns
about the distribution of benefits from this trade have grown (eg. Republic of Kenya (1982,
1985)). The government  has experienced  problems  in monitoring  and regulating the pricing and
financial  practices of firms which are trading with subsidiaries  or associated firms overseas.'
From a long-term development  perspective, this structure of trade has also served to provide
25  See cases in Kaplinsky  (1979), Gachuki  (1982), and Jaffee (1990).
15relatively little experience for Kenyan Africans in  the international marketing of  Kenya's
horticultural  crops, experience  which could be potentially  applied to other agro-industrial  areas.
IV.  COMPETITION IN PRIVATE AGRICULTURAL MARKETS
28.  A wide range of factors influence the competitive structure of markets and the forms
which competition  amongst private firms take. Such factors include:
(i)  technical factors such as  economies of scale, the technical sophistication and
specialization of  production and  marketing  functions,  and  the  level  of
development  of transport and communications  infrastructure,
(ii)  institutional  factors  such as government licensing and regulatory policies and
effectiveness  of legal systems, and
(iii)  social,  cultural,  and  historical factors  which  condition  attitudes  toward
competition and  shape the ways  in  which economic entities cooperate and
compete.
29.  The existing literature provides evidence that foodcrop markets in Africa which feature
a predominant  role for the private sector are generally competitive  at the wholesale and retail
levels despite weaknesses in  transport and  information infrastructure, in  formal financial
institutions, and  in  the  enforcement of  law.6 However,  there  appear  to  be  different
expectations rejarding  the organization of  markets for  agricultural exports and  processed
products. Here, significant  economies  of scale in the use of processing  or marketing facilities,
strong technical, financial, and managerial  barriers to entry, and the oligopolistic  structure of
world markets may be expected to result in higher levels of concentration."'
26  See, for example, Jones, W.  (1980) and Jones, D. (1982).
:7  See, for example, Schatz (1987), van der Laan (1987,1990),  and Lele (1988).
1630.  The competitive patterns within the Kenyan horticultural sub-sector are varied. In the
early years (mid-1950s  to mid-1960s)  of Kenya's exports in fresh fruit and vegetables, trade was
dominated by three firms who were also the leading fresh produce domestic wholesalers  at the
time. These firms competed  against one another in procuring  the available  high-quality  produce,
in obtaining  allocations of the limited  air-freight space, and in servicing  local institutions  and the
local high-income  residential districts. One of these firms, Kenya Horticultural Exporters Ltd.
(KHE), acquired a dominant position in the trade, by providing improved buying services (eg.
credit, input supply, seasonal planning, timely payment) to the major medium-to-large-scale
producers  and by developing  several effective  marketing  channels  to distribute its produce in the
United Kingdom . By the late 1960s, KHE accounted for more than one-half of Kenya's total
fresh produce exports.
31.  During the  1970s, there occurred a  large increase in  the number of  fresh produce
exporters with some farmers integrating forward into trade and with some firms entering the
trade from other lines of business. By 1978, there were eighty licensed  exporters in part due to
government implementation  of a very liberal licensing scheme. With Kenya's export trade in
other agricultural commodities being controlled by parastatal monopoly marketing boards or
multinational  coiporations, the fresh produce trade provided one of the few areas where local
private firms could enter into export trading.  By the 1980s, there were over one hundred
licensed  exporters, many buying and selling  the same commodities.  Such widespread  entry into
the trade led a  series of  foreign advisors to  the  Kenyan government to  warn against the
'fragmentation' of  the  trade  and  its potential adverse effects (see  below). Such advisors
17recommended  that the government intervene to centralize the trade into one  or very few
companies.  28
32.  Widespread entry into the export trade  has undermined  attempts  to  pre-plan the
allocation of available air-freight space among exporters and has prevented the country from
developing  effective  brand name promotion for its commodity  lines. However, the entry o. some
one hundred firms in the trade masks the fact that a limited number of firms stil  a.  *unt  for a
dominant share of trade (see Table 3). The bulk of the new entrants into the trade have served
as little more than a part-time, small-scale  competitive  fringe whose participation  in the industry
has normally lasted for only one or two seasons.
Table  3:  Concentration  of Kenyva's  Fresh Fruit and Vegetable  Exports (Percentage  Shares of Export Volumes)
1970*  1979b  1981b  1985b
Largest 3 Firms  75  44  55  49
Largest  6 Firms  83  65  79  67
Largest 9 Firms  90  74  89  82
a.  Based  on Winters  et  al. (1969)  and Field  Interviews
b.  Calculated  from  file  data  of the Horticultural  Crops  Development  Authority.
Source: Author's  Field  Research
33.  Competition  in the fresh produce trade has taken several forms. The first of these is
competition in  the procurement of crops. This competition has generated benefits for both
smailholder  and larger farmers by increasing  prices paid to farmers and leading marketing  firms
:  Among  those  advocating  the centralization  of trade were Winters et al. (1969), Prco  tor  (1976), Adelstal
(1979), and Hormana  and Will (1987), representing  British and German  technical  assistance  and that of the
International  Trade  Center.
18to set up buying operations in new locations so as to diversify their sources of supply. Some
firms have sought to escape from this competition  by integrating  backward  into farm production.
Second,  competition  for the available  air-freight space on commercial  air carriers has increased,
leading to  last-minute off-loads of produce and an upward bidding of air-freight charges,
especially during the peak export months of December to February. 29 This has increased the
risks faced by traders and provided  an entry barrier for new, small-scale  exporters. Third, there
has been increased competition  in foreign markets with many firms sending the same products
to the same markets, frequently  using the same agents. This pattern has allowed foreign buyers
and agents to play off one Kenyan  exporter against another. The challenge faced by Kenya is
to combine competition in the procurement of crops within the country with a more effective
coordination  of export sales operations to improve exporter bargaining  power overseas.
34.  Patterns of competition  in Kenya's cut flower industry have been quite different than in
its fresh produce trade. Kenya's initial cut flower exports in the 1950s  and 1960s  were undertaken
by a few small nursery operations run by European settlers. These nurseries shared technical
information,  although  their crop specialities  differed. The entire structure  of Kenya's nascent  cut
flower industry was transformed  in the late 1960s  and early 1970s  by a large-scale  investment by
one of Europe's rargest flower producing and trading companies. 30 The firm was given highly
favorable  investment terms by the Kenyan government, including  a low-cost  lease of a 15,000
-9  The Kenyan govemment has set official air-freight rates  for  fresh horticultural commodities being
transported  to various European  and Middle Eastern destination. However, due to the excess demnd  for freight
space during the peak export months, some exporters offer side-payments  or other inducements  to the air carriers
to guarantee  freight space.
3'  The investment  was by the Danish firm Dansk Chrysanthemum  Kultur (DCK), then the world's largest
producer of chrysanthemum  cuttings and an active producer and trader of other types of flowers. The Danish
government  provided a cash grant for the project, equivalent  to one-third of its establishment  costs.
19acre estate, exclusive growing and trading rights for several types of flowers  over an eight-year
period, and important financial  incentives.  This firm (and its descendents)  would dominate the
Kenyan industry through to the early 1980s. 31
35.  During the 1980s, several additional firms have entered the industry. Many such firms
were direct spin-offs from the original  foreign investment  as that company's expatriate  and local
experts have formed their own flower production and/or trading companies. Other flower
producers/exporters  emerged nearby to the original foreign investment  project after observing
its apparent success.  Nevertheless,  direct competiton  in Kenya's cut flower industry has been
limited due to different lines of crop specialization  amongst firms and different market outlets.
3^6.  In the fruit and vegetable  processing  industry, the number of firms has increased slightly
over the past quarter century. By the mid-1980s,  there were about fifteen such firms, although
only six firms  employed fifty peovle  or more. The export-oriented  firms do not compete  against
one another since they have  entirely different  product  lines and serve  different markets. Several
such firms have faced competition  from the local fresh produce market when procuring crops
for processing. In a number of cases, such competition  has resulted in severe shortages of raw
materials for the processors and low rates of factory capacity utilization.  Other firms nave
countered this competition  by integrating  backward  into farm-level  production  or by contracting
outgrowers (see below). For  those processors which have focused on the Kenyan domestic
market, there has been competition  for raw material supplies  as well as for market share. The
31  In 1976,  the major Danish  shareholder  in the DCK project  suddenly  withdrew  his investment,  allegedly  to
purchase  a shipyard  in his native  country. The DCK farms  were first passed into Kenyan  ownership  before Brooke
Bond acquired the company's mnajor  assets and continued flower production  and trade using many of the same
personnel.
20latter  has  taken both  the  form  of  copying each  others  product  lines  and  production
differentiation  through quality improvement  and brand name promotion.
V.  PRIVATE FIRMS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF CROP PROCUREMENT
37.  To  efficiently carry  out  their  processing operations or  to  meet  their  marketing
requirements, the private firms participating in Kenya's horticultural export sub-sector must
procure commodities  or raw materials  which match their needs in terms of quantity, quality, and
timing. In developing  their crop procurement  strategies, such firms will normally consider the
following  implications  of alternative  institutional  arrangements:
(i)  the levels of production and transaction costs incurred,
(ii)  the levels and distribution  of production,  political, and other risks, and
(iii)  their ability to effectively  control the available supplies.
38.  There  is  a  continuum of  institutional arrangements available to  a  firm  for  crop
procurement:
Spot  Market  Forward  Interlinked  Vertical
Market  Reciprocity  Market  Factor and  Integration
Purchase  Agreement  Contract  Market Contract
Market  Contract  Hierarchy
39.  On one end of the spectrum are spot market  purchases.  Here the processor or exporter
purchases his requirements  from the market at a particular time at market prices. The firm may
21buy  from farmers,  local merchants, or  truckers.  In  such an  institutional framework, the
processor or exporter will play absolutely no role in the production process itself.
40.  On the other end of the spectrum  is the vertical  integration  of production  and subsequent
processing  and marketing  activities. Here the marketing firm develops its own farm and flows
of information  and resources for production are internalized  within the firm.
41.  In between  these two extremes  are various intermediate  arrangements.  For example, there
may be market reciprocity agreements. 32 These are informal, yet highly personalized repeat
trading ties in which some degree of loyalty is built up between the exporter and a  certain
sub-set of growers. Still, produce is exchanged at the current market price and the exporter is
not involved in the production process.
42.  Two  types of  intermediate contractual arrangements are  indicated.  Firstly,  crop
procurement can be made viaforward market contracts which feature formal committments  to
buy and sell specified quantities and qualities of produce at particular times. Prices may be
agreed to in advance  or at the time of actual exchange. A more intensive  arrangement combines
these forward purchase and  sale committments with buyer promises to  provide specified
production inputs and technical advice on credit and farmer agreement to follow the buyer's
instructions regarding production.  Such interlinkedfactor  and market  contracts are frequently
referred to as contract farming.
43.  Along the  continuum from spot  market purchases toward vertical integration, the
relationship between  the  exporter/processor and  the  crop  producer  changes  in  several
fundamental  ways. For example,
32  As an example, see Geertz (1978) on exhange  relations  in the 'bazaar' economy.
22(i)  decisions regarding production and sales become more centralized in the hands
of the exporter or processor,
(ii)  the relationship between producer and buyer becomes  more  formalized,
(iii)  the terms of exchange become  more extended into thefuture,  and
(iv)  the role of market  prices in coordinating  production and marketing  is reduced  and
progressively supplemented  by operating rules and direct supervision.
44.  What institutional  arrangements for crop procurement would one expect to find in the
Kenyan  horticultural  export sub-sector?  Horticultural  crops have  certain  technical  and production
characteristics  which might render spot market purchases costly or highly risky for exporters
and/or processors. For example, most horticultural  crops are highly  perishable  in their raw form.
This forces growers to identify immediate  sales outlets. They caniot store the crop waiting for
improved prices.  They risk auality losses whenever  there is multiple handling of the crop or
gaps in post-harvest  operations.
45.  Secondly,  horticultural  crops exhibit wide variation in their quality from unit to unit due
to the many different botanical varieties grown and the important influence of production and
post-harvest  practices and environmental  conditions.  This poses severe problems in effectively
matching  the quality supplied  with that demanded  by an exporter or processor when transactions
occur through the  spot market. Thirdly, many horticultural crops must be harvested and
delivered on  a carefully scheduled basis in  order to  maintain high and  stable inputs into
processing  facilities or to take advantage of market window opportunities  in the fresh produce
trade. However, spot  market procurement arrangements are  unlikely to  match supply and
demand for raw materials over time.
2346.  Among  different horticultural  crops there are considerable  differences in their degree of
perishability, in  the economic significance of quality variability, in  the specificity of crop
delivery schedules,  and of other technical  and production  characteristics. Also, recognizing  that
spot market purchases may be an unsuitable  procurement mode still does not guide us to the
actual arrangements which firms might adopt.
A.  Application  of Transaction  Cost Economics
47.  Within economics, there is a growing body of literature, falling under the heading of
transaction  cost  economics,  which  seeks  to  account  for  varying  patterns  of  organization."
While primarily developed  for and applied to the study of organizational  patterns in large-scale
industries, elements of  transaction cost economics can  be applied to  concerns about the
organization  of crop procurement systems by agricultural traders or processors.-"
48.  This literature focuses on the organization  of transactions or,  more broadly, exchange
relationships.  It demonstrates  that there does not exist any single institutional structure which
is superior to all others on efficiency  grounds. Rather, different institutional  arrangemenits  are
shown to have particular advantages  and disadvantages,  with their relative suitability  depending
upon the actual operating conditions surrounding the  trading relationship. In  defining the
operating conditions,  emphasis  is given in the literature to two main elements:  1)  the extent to
33  In contrast with traditional rnicroeconotnic  analysis where institutions are exogenously determined,
transaction  cost economics,  together  with other branches  of the so-called 'New Institutional  Economics", seeks  to
explain the origins  or current existence  of institutions,  to account for the particular forms which they have taken,
and to  examine  the efficiency  and distributional  properties  of alternative  institutional  forms. The major  elements  and
propositions  of transaction  cost economics  are provided  in Williamson  (1975,  1985),  Langlois  (1986),  and Bromley
(1989).
34  John (1980)  and Reve  (1980)  apply transaction  cost concepts  to the study of industrial  nurketing channels.
See Bardhan  (1989)  for applications  of elements  of transaction  cost econontics  to the study of agrarian institutions
in developing  countries.
24which the required investments in productive assets are specialized for a particular product or
trading relationship, and  2)  the  overall degree of  uncertainty  surrounding the  exchange
relationship.
49.  For any particular production and trading operation, individuals may undertake either
generalized or  specialized investments. Certain types of  plant, equipment, materials, and
knowledge have potentially generalized use across a broad range of products or trades. Other
assets are  highly specialized for a  particular product or  trade outlet and have little or  no
alternative  use or value outside  of this product or trading area.  Examples of asset-specificity  in
agriculture include crops with extended gestation periods or production cycles (such as fruit
trees), large-scale  specialized  processing  and post-harvest  facilities, and use cf highly  specialized
production inputs and technical knowledge.
50.  In any particular trading context, the degree of  uncertainty may vary-- uncertainty
regarding  the availability  of supplies  or market outlets, the quality of the products on offer, the
timing of supply and demand, the trading terms being offered, possible political interventions,
and so on. Such uncertainties  tend to be more pronounced  in agriculture than in industry  because
of the important  influence  of changing  weather  conditions  and the wider geographical  dispersion
of primary producers and intermediate  users.
51.  In the theoretical  literature  of transaction  cost economics, it is proposed that spot market
exchange, long-term contracts, and  vertical integration will  each  be  efficient modes of
organization, defined in terms of economizing  on a combination  of production  and transaction
costs, under different degrees of asset-specificity  and uncertainty. The table below summarizes
the hypothesized  relationships.
25Table 4:  Operating Conditions and Appropriate Institutional Arrangement
ASSET  SPECIFICITY
High  Mcdium  Low
U
N  High  Vertical  Vertical  Long-term
C  Integration  Integration  Contract
E
R  Medium  Vertical  Long-term  Long-term Contract
T  Integration  Contract  or Spot Market
A
I  Low  Vertical  Long-term  Spot
N  Integration  Contract  Market
T
y
52.  The literature contends  that under conditions  of high asset-specificity,  the most efficient
mode of organization is the vertical integration of  the two adjacent stages of production or
marketing. The firm investing  in specialized  assets, particularly those which are durable and
involve large sunk costs, will be highly vulnerable to opportunistic bargaining on the part of
suppliers or buyers since they will know that this investor has little or no alternative use for such
assets and thus must come to terms unless it is in a monopolistic  or monopsonistic  position.
Vertical integration  is also viewed  as an effective  means of countering  high levels of operational
uncertainty, since a  central management  gains control over  the different stages and direct
supervision  can be introduced.
53.  On the  other  hand, when asset specificity is  moderate to  low,  other  institutional
arrangements are viewed as more suitable than vertical integration since they tend to provide
greater flexibility of action, have lower 'start-up' costs, and do not incur the heavy overhead
costs associated with integrating separate operations. Long-term contracts enable buyers and
26sellers to counter market uncertainties  by offering  mutual assurances  and by supplementing  price
signals with other informational  devices related to the quantity, quality, and timing of expected
deliveries  and purchasing requirements. Where both asset-specificity  and uncertainty  are low,
spot market arrangements  may be most efficient as this gives the participants  greatest flexibility
of action and immediate signals about performance. It is generally  easier (and less costly) to
negotiate  an adjustment  in price levels than to agree upon and implement  changes  in trading rules
or lines of command.
54.  In order to operationalize  the insights of transaction cost economics for the purpose of
developing  and testing hypotheses  regarding the organization  of crop procurement systems, we
have developed  proxy indicators for both asset-specifity  and uncertainty  for which quantitative
or qualitative measures  can be obtained  in Kenyan  horticulture. These proxy indicators and the
rating system employed for our empirical analysis are as follows:
Asset Specificity:
(i)  the length of the crop production cycle or gestation period between the initial
planting of the crop and the first commercial  harvest. A production cycle of six
months or  less will be rated as  'short',  one of  6-12 months will be  rated
'medium', while one of 12+  months will be rated 'long'.
(ii)  the scope  for scale economies in processing  and post harvest operations. In this
case, qualitative  assessments  of 'low',  'medium', and 'high' are based upon the
minimum  efficient scale for the most restrictive processing  activity, the needs for
post-harvest treatments (eg. cleaning and waxing), and the advantages of cold
storage.
(iii)  the  degree  of  specialization of  material production  inputs  and  technical
knowledge.  A 'high' rating signifies  that important  inputs  or cultivating  techniques
are used exclusively  for the particular  crop in Kenya. A 'medium' rating indicates
that important  inputs (and techniques)  have  few alternative  applications  in Kenyan
agriculture. A 'low' rating indicates  a general applicability  of material  inputs and
technical knowledge  used.
27Uncertinty:
(i)  the degree or rate of commoditv/raw material perishabilitv. A  'high'  rating
signifies that the crop maintains  its quality before deterioration  (under appropriate
storage conditions) for less than one week. A 'medium' rating is assigned for
crops maintaining  their quality for 1 to 3 weeks, while a 'low' rating is assigned
tor crops maintaining  their quality for more than three weeks after harvest.
(ii)  the degree of specificity  in the commodiry/raw  material quality required. A 'high'
rating indicates that quality must meet exacting (high) standards. A 'medium'
rating indicates that quality standards are set within a specified range, while a
'low'  rating indicates that quality standards are not tightly defined and simply
minimum  permissa.ble  standards are set.
(iii)  the degree of specificitv in the  timing of harvests and crop delivenes. A 'high'
rating indicates that harvests and deliveries must be timed to  meet daily or
two-day processing/marketing  requirements. A  'medium' rating indicates that
harvests and deliveries must be timed for bi-weekly to  weekly procurement
requirements, while a  'low'  rating indicates that more flexible harvesting and
delivery patterns are acceptable to the processor/exporter.
B.  Crop Procurement  Arrangements  for Processed Fruit and Vegetables
55.  The table below rates the  most important processed fruit and vegetables in  Kenya
according to  the  above technical and market factors and indicates the expected mode for
organizing  the link between exporter/processors  and farm producers of the crop. As there is no
a priori way of weighting the different proxy variables, we take a crude average of the ratings
for  the  three  variables under each  heading when  making predictions about  institutional
arrangements.
56.  The procurement  and canning of pineapples  exhibits  the property of high asset-specificity
wit}.  the crop itself having an extended  production cycle and with there being major economies
of scale in post-harvest  and processing  operations. As defined above, the degree of uncertainty
associated  with pineapple  procurement  is likely  to be moderate,  although  the raw material  quality
28requirements for an internationally competitive industry will be very exacting.  With high
asset-specificity  and moderate  uncertainty, we expect a vertically-integrated  system (see Table
4).
Table 5: Asset  Specificiry,  Uncertainty, and Horticultural  Crops for  Processing
ASSET  SPECIFICITY  UNCERTAINTY  Expected
Production  Scale  Inputs  Perish-  Qual.  Timing  Mode of
Cycle  Econ.  Specif.  ability  Specif.  Specif.  Coordination
Pineapple (Canning)  Long  High  Med.  Low  High  Med.  Vert. Int.
French beans  (Cannirg)  Short  Med.  Low  Med.  High  Med.  L-T  Ctr.*
Carrots (Dehydration)  Med.  High  Low  Low  Med.  Med.  L-T  Ctr.*
Passion  Fruit (Juice)  Med.  Med.  Med.  Low  Low  Low  L-T  Ctr.*
Orange (Juice)  Long  Med.  Low  Low  Med.  Low  L-T  Ctr.*
Forward  market  contract  or interlined  factor  and market  contract.
Source:  Based  on Author's  Field Research
57.  In the case of french beans  for canning,  asset-specificity  does not appear to be a problem,
yet the uncertainty  surrounding  effective  crop procurement is expected to be moderate  to high.
Some form of long-term contractual link between the processor and french bean producers is
thus  expected. For  the  other  crops  listed in  the  table,  there  is  a  moderate degree of
asset-specificity  associated  with crop production and processing, while there is expected to be
a low-to-moderate  degree of uncertainty. Here again, some form of long-term contractual link
is expected to govern crop procurement  operations. Hence, one would not expect spot market
29purchases or similar arrangements  to be the primary mode for procuring any of these crops for
processing.
58.  Before examining the actual crop procurement arrangements for Kenya's  fruit and
vegetable processors, it is important to note that real institutional structures are  not strictly
determined  or caused by the techno-economic  factors  emphasized  by transaction  cost economics.
Institutional patterns in particular countries and industries are also shaped by historical and
political factors as well as characteristics  of the participating  firms and farmers. In this article,
limitations  of space do not enable us to provide full coverage of the evolution of institutional
arrangements  in Kenyan horticulture  and the broad set of factors shaping such processes.
59.  Table 6 below denotes the actual institutional  arrangements  for the procurement  of these
crops during the mid-1980s.  The only exception is that of carrots for which the indicated
institutional arrangements are  for  1980, the last year that the major vegetable dehydration
factory was in continuous operation.
Table 6:  Crop Procurement  Arrangements  for Erporr-oriented  Processing
(Percentage  Slhare  of Raw Material Volutme,  1985/86)
Spot  Market  Frwd. Mkt.  Interlinked  Vertical
Crop  Market  Recipr.  Contract  Contract  Integ.
Pineapple  0  0  0  5  9
French  beans  5  0  0  95  0
Caffots  *  0  0  0  95  5
Passion  Fruit  60  0  20  20  0
Orange  80  0  20  0  0
*  For 1980.
Source:  Author's  Field  Survey
3060.  As expected, the canning of pineapple features a strong degree of vertical integration
between raw  material production and subsequent processing functions. The major firm, a
subsidiary of  a multinational corporation, has a  large (20,000 acre) plantation and a  large
processing facility on a contiguous  site. This industry was not always organized as such. In the
1950s and 1960s, raw material supplies for several competing factories came from several
hundred small and larger outgrowers. However, supplies from these sources remained very
unreliable in terms of both quantity and quality due to shortages of planting materials, the
locations (eg. high altitude) of many of the outgrower farms, and farmer inclinations  to direct
the better quality fruit to the higher priced fresh produce market. Following the entry of the
multinational firm into the industry in the  mid-1960s,  the firm was given a  monopoly on
processing and developed, with govemment  assistance, a large-scale plantation. This mode of
crop  procurement proved to  be more efficient and  more in  line with  the company's past
experience in other countries. Since 1974,  over 90 percent of the factory's raw material in-take
has been from the company-owned  estates.
61.  The procurement of french beans for canning is presently based on a highly-intensive
contract farming scheme involving  nearly 20,000 smaliholder  farmers. 35 This is consistent  with
our expectations based on techno-economic  considerations.  The processing company, a joint
venture  between a local firm and a major European  food manufacturer/distributor,  controls  entry
into the scheme, the size of individual plantings, the timing of all cultural practices, input
supplies, product quality, and post-harvest  operations. This scheme was developed  in the early
1980s, following  upon a series of failed ventures  to procure beans for canning from centralized
33  See  Jaffee (1987) for a detail case study of this sub-sector.
31factory estates or large-farm outgrowers. The careful husbandry practices required to produce
a high-quality french bean rendered large farm production unviable due to problems of labor
recruitment  and supervision.  The European  joint venture partner brought with it to Kenya prior
experience in  organizing and  managing a  contract farming scheme for  french beans (in
Morocco).
62.  The procurement  of carrots for dehydration  also featured a contract farming scheme  with
smallholders, numbering about 3000 during the peak years of operation. 36 This scheme was
initially developed  just after independence  by agencies of the Kenyan government in order to
provide supplemental incomes for smaliholders being settled in  a  major land transfer and
settlement program  (The  'Million  Acres'  Scheme)  and  in  order  to  establish effective
administrative  control over the settlement  areas. The project later expanded to include other
crops and to involve the processing  company developing its own nucleus estates. While there
is a large local market for carrots, the firm required a variety of carrot which is not preferred
in the fresh market. The firm provided seeds and technical  assistance and controlled the timing
of plantings  and harvests.
63.  The actual institutional  arrangements for passion fruit and orange procurement (in the
mid-1980s)  deviate from expectations  as laid out above. In the case of passion fruit, the major
firm, a joii.t venture between a foreign company and a Kenyan parastatal, did implement a
contract farming scheme in several parts of the country between the mid-1960s  and the late
1970s. However, by the latter period, the firm came under increasingly  intensive competition
from the fresh produce trade and from other processors to obtain the available supplies. The
36  Ibid.
32result was a collapse  of the firm's contractual  ties and its need to resort to spot market purchases
for the bulk of its raw material requirements. With such supplies being inadequate, the firm
sought (in the early 1980s)  to develop its own nucleus estate. However, this investment was
vetoed  by the Kenyan  government,  out of concern that the existing  growers would subsequently
lack sufficient outlets for their crop.  To compensate,  the processor has entered into seasonal
contracts  with several  large-scale  producers,  providing  them with inputs  and technical  assistance.
64.  The main producers of orange  juice for export have been primarily product-diversified,
locally-owned  companies. They have rarely entered into any forward purchasing arrangements
in which  prices were pre-specified  or inputs  and credit were provided.  Their preference  is to buy
raw maerials in bulk at cheap prices during the periods of local market gluts and then to store
such supplies in a semi-processed  state. No special varieties are required and the only quality
stipulation  is that the delivered  fruit be mature  and disease-free. As in the case of passion fruit,
forward market  arrangements  have  been made with a limited  number  of large-scale  growers who
have sought market assurances.
C.  Procurement  Arrangements  for Fresh Horticultural  Commodities
65.  Table 7 rates six fresh fruit, vegetables,  and cut flowers according  to the same technical
and market criteria used above to predict intemational pattems in the procurement of  raw
materials  for processing.
66.  From the point of view of risk and coordination  problems in crop procurement (and
production), the most difficult crops would appear to be chrysanthemums  (grown for cuttings)
and  strawberries. Each  features moderate levels of  asset-specificity, but  high  levels of
33uncertainty  due to their rapid perishability  and exact  timing requirements.  It is expected that each
will feature vertically integrated  production and marketing operations.
Table 7:  Asset Specificity, Uncertainty,  and Fresh Horticultural Commodities
ASSET  SPECIFICITY  UNCERTAINTY  Expected
Production  Scale  Inputs  Perish-  Qual.  Timing  Mode of
Cycle  Econ.  Specif.  ability  Specif.  Specif.  Coordination
Carnation  Short  Med.  Med.  High  Med.  Mod.  L-T Ctr.
Chrysanthemum  Short  Med.  High  High  High  High  Vert. Intr.
Mango  Long  Med.  Low  Med.  Med.  Med.  L-T  Ctr.
Strawberry  Med.  Low  High  High  Med.  High  Vert. Intr.
French beans  Short  Low  Low  Mcd.  Med.  Med.  L-T/Spot
Chillies  Med.  Low  Low  Med.  Med.  Med.  L-T/Spot
Source:  Based on Author's Field Research
67.  Mango and carnation  production and procurement  each feature moderate levels of both
asset-specificity  and uncertainty.  Some  form of long-term  contractual  link betweer producers and
exporters  is therefore  expected.  The two vegetables  listed in the table, french beans and chillies,
feature low levels of asset-specificity  and a moderate  degree of uncertainty .ssociated with crop
procurement. Under such circumstances, either long-term contractual  ties or more market-like
arrangements  could provide an efficient link between producers and exporters.
68.  Table 8 denotes the actual institutional  arrangements  prevailing  during the mid-1980s  in
Kenya for the respective crops.
34Table 8:  Crop Procurement Arrangements for  Fresh Horticultural  Exports
(Percentage Share of Commodir,  Volume, 1986)
Spot  Market  Frwd. Mkt.  Interlinked  Vertical
Crop  Market  Recipr.  Contract  Contract  Integ.
Carnation  0  5  0  0  95
Chrysanthemum  0  0  0  0  100
Mango  35  40  20  0  5
Strawberry  10  0  90  0  0
French beans  20  20  30  20  10
Asian Vegetables  30  20  20  20  10
All Crops  (Value)  20  14  17  12  37
Source:  Author's Field Research)
69.  The table indicates a far greater diversity  of institutional  arrangements  than found in the
fruit and vegetable  processing  industry. For carnations, vertical integration  is unexpectedly  the
dor.inant coordinating mode. This  reflects the  pre-eminence of  one  major foreign-owned
company which has the largest carnation farm in the world operating in Kenya. This company
has built up a team of expatriate technical and post-harvest experts and has benefitted from
complementarities  with its other agricultural interests in Kenya, particularly in the supply of
production  inputs.  Smaller  producers of carnations have generally  been linked to exporters via
informal, on-going market ties.
70.  As expected, the production and marketing operations for chrysanthemum  cuttings are
vertically-integrated.  The company which is undertaking  this operation has developed  a highly
capital-,labor-, and management-intensive  system to produce and isolate some 163 varieties of
the  flower.  Altogether,  some 90  percent of  Kenya's  cut  flower  industry  is  based  on
35vertically-integrated  operations,  owing  to the limited  dispersion  of floricultural  knowledge  in the
country, problems in obtaining planting materials and other inputs, and logistical problems
associated  with the collection and handling  of highly perishable  cut flowers.
71.  Mango and strawberry do not fit the expected  institutional  patterns. In the case of mango,
much of the production is undertaken by smallholder  farmers in a remote location along the
Kenyan  coast. Exporters have little access or even contact with this area and have preferred to
utilize local merchants, acting as commission agents, to buy the crop at short-term market
prices. Mango is not a major commodity  for any of th- leading exporters, so there has been little
interest in direct involvemcnt in or support of production. Due to the influence of climatic
changes, the yielding  pattem of man6os  at the Kenyan  coast is very uneven, limiting the scope
for producers to fulfill long-term contracts with buyers.
72.  For strawberries, the leading  producer did integrate  forward into trade for several years,
but experienced continuous transport bottlenecks since it sought air-freight space only during
Kenya's peak export months of December to February. The firm has withdrawn from direct
trade, relying upon existing larger exporters  to manage  the heacaches  of logistics, transport, and
overseas sales.  Seasonal purchase and  supply contracts have been entered into with  such
companies.
73.  French beans and Asian vegetables (including chillies, okra, karela, and other
traditional  South Asian vegetables)  exhibit very diverse institutional  patterns linking producers
and exporters. Among  the larger exporters, the common  practice is to have  long-term  contractual
arrangements  with a limited number of large-scale growers and then supplement  these supplies
with spot Market  or similar purchases from smallholders.  The risks associated  with changes in
36market conditions or the availability  of air-freight space are thus borne by such smallholders.
Small and part-tirne exporters, who lack storage facilities  and have limited financial resources
and technical skills, tend to  obtain most supplies via  spot market purchases. While their
purchases are uneven, these smaller firms have very low overhead costs and are thus able to
offer larger cash payments  than the more established  firms. This feature has undermined  several
contract farming schemes which the larger firms have attempted to develop with smallholders.
74.  The bottom line in Table 8 provides  a rough estimate of shares of different institutional
arrangements  in the total value of Kenya's fresh horticultural trade. It indicates that more than
1/3  of the trade involves  vertically-  integrated  operations  and about one-half  of the trade features
some form of tightly controlled  procurement  system. Only about 1/3 of the trade features crop
procurement  based on spot or similar market purchases.
75.  This analysis has demonstrated  the potential  to operationalize  the major propositions of
transaction  cost economics  to study the development  of alternative  institutional  arrangements in
agricultural  marketing  and agro-industry.  In this area, additional  work remains in both specifying
and quantifying  the relevant independent  and dependarit  variables. As noted earlier, researchers
should be cautious about ascribing  a causal relationship  between transaction  co.  t factors and the
observed  institutional  structures.  As in the Kenyan  horticultural  case, there may be other factors,
including historical  and political factors, which play important roles in the actual development
and  evolution of  institutions. The  proper  approach is  to  incorporate considerations of
asset-specificity,  uncertainty, and agency into historical analyses of institutional development
patterns in particular agricultural  trade or agro-industrial  settings.
37VI.  CONCLUSIONS
76.  Amongst African governments and international financial institutions there is strong
interest in the scope for and potential  benefits  of agricultural  market liberalization  and expanding
the role of  the private sector in  agricultural trade. This paper has shown th.at sub-sectors
featuring widespread entry and a dominant role for the private sector can indeed develop in a
very dynamic fashion. Nevertheless, the experience of Kenyan horticulture indicates that the
quest for institutional  reform must look beyond the tapping of nascent private entrepreneurship
to consider  the nature of potentially  successful  private enterprises in the African trading context
and the ways in  which such firms can organize both their crop procurement and trading
operations. Such  patterns will have  strong implications both  for  efficiency and  for  the
distribution  of benefits from expanded  trade.
77.  Even with  market liberalization, the technical characteristics of  many crops,  their
production,  and  their  processing  may  lead  to  centralized  procurement and  marketing
arrangements. It is not only in horticulture, but also for a wide range of other exportable crops
and agro-industries in developing countries (including sugar, tea, oilseeds, dairy, tobacco,)
where scale economies, quality heterogeneity, commodity/raw material perishability, lengthy
production cycles,  and  so on  may render open market arrangements hazardous for both
producers and processors/traders  and, depending upon market size, limit the number of scale
efficient processing  plants to only one or very few. Hence, market liberalization  may simply
involve a shift from centralized  public control to some form of centralized private control.
78.  The latter may indeed  be preferable, although  improved  means will have to be developed
for governments  to regulate foreign investment  flows, to monitor and regulate dominant  firms,
38and to improve the bargaining  position  of farmers  vis-a-vis  centralized  contracting  organizations.
Any trend  toward expanded contractual or  integrated ties between producers and  private
marketing enterprises  may also  require  changes  in  the  traditional means of  organizing
agricultural  research, extension,  and input  supply, perhaps in the direction of joint public/private
activities or the transfer of some functions  over to the private firms.
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Graph 1:  Growth of  Kenyan  Horticultural  Exports
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